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by Murray L. Weidenbaum
This article examines the relationship between government policy and
energy needs, with special attention to the taxation and regulation of
gasoline.

It concludes with a series of proposals for reducing or eliminating

the special treatment -- both supportive and punitive --that now
characterizes public policy in the United States toward the energy sector of
American industry.
The U.S. petroleum industry's stock of plant and equipment far exceeds
that of any other sector of American industry.

But the industry's mass of

capital is not merely a reflection of its large size.
energy sector, it is extremely capital intensive.

As the nation's major

As shown in Table 1, oil

companies use far more capital per worker than any other industry.
In 1981, the petroleum refining industry reported $314,801 in assets per
employee, and mining and crude-oil producers reported $383,787.

In striking

contrast, the chemical industry reported $94,299, and the all-industry average
was a modest $60,437 in assets per worker.

But these figures are not a matter

of the energy industry resting on its economic laurels.
The U.S. Department of Energy has estimated that the domestic oil and gas
industry will need to invest an average of $25-30 billion annually during
the 1980s for exploratory development, production, and refining capacity to
achieve modest energy goals.

Other private estimates range as high as $35

Dr. Murray Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and
Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington
University.
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TABLE 1
Capital Intensity, For Selected Industries, 1981
Industry

Assets Per Employee

Mining and Crude-oil Production
Petroleum Refining

$383,787
314,801

Beverages

95,828

Chemicals

94,299

Paper, Fiber and Wood Products

92,023

Metal Manufacturing

82,380

Tobacco

78,730

Pharmaceuticals

74,388

Publishing and Printing

57,924

Soaps and Cosmetics

57,175

Average For All Industries

Source:

Computed from data in Fortune, May 3, 1982.

$ 60,437

3

billion a year.1

The magnitude of that financial task can be better

appreciated when we consider that comparable expenditures were less than $13
billion in 1972 and approximately $20 billion in 1978.

The Energy Department

also estimates that the domestic coal industry will have to invest between $5
and $6 billion annually during the 1980s to achieve modest energy goals.

This

compares to actual investments of less than $1 billion in 1972 and $2.4
billion in 1978.
Review of Government Policy and the Energy Industry
Any balanced review of the development of the federal government's tax
and regulatory policy toward the energy industry would conclude that it has
had a checkered past.2
The first major development in energy policy in the United States was the
establishment in 1926 of the system of depletion allowances for oil and gas.
In that year, Congress amended the recently enacted Internal Revenue Code to
set percentage depletion allowance rules, permitting oil and gas producers and
royalty owners to receive, tax-free, 27.5 percent of the wellhead value of oil
and gas production (up to 50 percent of the net income from each property).
These rules stayed in effect until the Tax Reform Act of 1969.

A related tax

provision permits the immediate write-off of intangible drilling costs which
occur in oil and gas exploration and development, such as the wages of
drilling crews.
1Economic Report of the President, January 1980, Washington, D.C., U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 115.
2walter J. Mead, "The Use of Taxes, Regulation, and Price Controls in the
Energy Sector, .. National Tax Journal, September 1978, pp. 229-235; and Murray
L. Weidenbaum, Business, Government, and the Public, second edition, Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1981, pp. 114-128.
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Over the years these two tax incentives -- depletion allowances and
expensing of intangible drilling costs --had a strong effect on the energy
industry.

They led to high levels of domestic investment, large new oil

discoveries, a low average price of energy, and a resultant high consumption
pattern of energy in the United States.
operate independently.

But the tax incentives did not

These conditions resulted in the passage of important

regulatory legislation in the 1930s.
Act authorized states to limit (or

11

The Interstate Oil Compact Commission
prorate 11 ) all oil production within their

borders in order to avoid 11 Wasteful 11 levels of production and market

11

gluts. 11

The Connally Hot Oil Act was the enforcement mechanism; it denied producers
the right to sell their product in interstate commerce in violation of state
prorationing laws.
From 1960 through 1965, for example, prorating by the Texas Railroad
Commission limited production to 27-29 percent of the basic maximum allowable
rate of production by well.

The operation of the prorationing system served,

in effect, to offset much of the impact that the tax incentives had on
petroleum prices and output.
To make matters worse, market-demand prorationing supported domestic oil
prices at levels that substantially exceeded the price of imported oil.

This

relationship, of course, encouraged the growth of petroleum imports into the
United States.

With rising imports, the market supply restrictions imposed by

the prorationing system became increasingly difficult for domestic producers
to bear.

In 1959, President Eisenhower, by executive proclamation, imposed

mandatory quotas on oil imports.

The import quotas led to more rapid

exploitation of domestic oil reserves than would have occurred otherwise.
Previously, in 1954, the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal Energy
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Regulatory Commission) had set wellhead prices for natural gas flowing into
interstate commerce at levels substantially below world market prices.

The

FPC action thus encouraged more domestic consumption of energy.
Thus, during the years of rapid economic growth that characterized much
of the period following World War II, the United States had available energy
below world market prices.

As a result of government policy, therefore, this

nation on balance consumed far more oil and natural gas than would have been
the case under a free market situation.
The regulatory atmosphere began to change dramatically in the 1970s.

In

August 1971, President Nixon imposed price controls on the economy generally
(exempting special sectors such as agriculture).

In 1973-74 the controls were

lifted on everything except crude oil and petroleum prices.
The combination of tax subsidies and import quotas stimulated domestic
oil production for decades.

This encouraged the rapid utilization of domestic

energy and the growing dependence on foreign sources.

The economic impacts of

the import restrictions became increasingly difficult to live with, and
President Nixon eliminated them effective May 1, 1973. 3
But the growing dependence of the United States on foreign energy in
recent years has been accompanied, oddly enough, by a shift in tax policy away
from encouragement of domestic energy development and production.
Tax Reform Act reduced depletion allowances to 22 percent.

The 1969

Subsequently, the

Tax Reduction Act of 1975 eliminated percentage depletion almost entirely for
major integrated producers of oil anrl gas.

That Act also provided for phased

reductions of tax depletion benefits for smaller producers, which are defined

3Mead, ~cit., p. 231.
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as producers that neither refine more than 50,000 barrels of oil a day nor
have a retail outlet.

Beginning in 1984, the applicable rate of percentage

depletion for those producers which are covered will be reduced from 22
percent to 15 percent, and the maximum amount of oil which is granted tax
exemption will be cut to 1,000 barrels a day; the maximum allowable exemption
for gas will be reduced to 6 million cubic feet of gas a day.

In 1976 and

1977, Congress enacted technical amendments to the Internal Revenue Code
which limited the tax advantages of intangible drilling costs.4
Meanwhile, beginning in late 1973 and extending through part of 1974, the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargoed the shipment of
oil to many nations, including the United States, and when it lifted the
embargo, it quadrupled world oil prices.

This situation led to the

establishment of a Federal Energy Administration, as well as a series of
actions by the federal government to increase domestic energy supply and
reduce demand.

However, those efforts were restricted by pressures both to

limit price increases to American consumers and to contain

11

Windfall 11 profits

on the part of American oil producers.
In December 1975 President Ford signed the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act.

The law provided for price controls on crude oil ranging from a low of

$5.25 a barrel on
barrel for

11

11

0ld 11 oil (oil from fields in operation in 1973) to $11.28 a

new 11 oil.

At the time, the world price of oil delivered to the

United States was $13.50 a barrel.

Under this act refiners were required to

make cost-equalizing payments to one another --so-called .. entitlements ...
These resulted in each refiner paying the same average price for a barrel of
oil, regardless of whether it was classified as

11

0ld 11 or new, .. or whether it

4The Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1981, Special Analyses, Washington,
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 218.
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was produced domestically or imported.

The average price established by the

combination of price controls and entitlements was below the imported price.
Each company importing foreign oil in effect received a subsidy from American
producers to cover the difference between the higher world price and the lower
and controlled price.

In May 1979 that subsidy came to $2.56 a barrel.

In the fall of 1977 Congress established a permanent Department of
Energy, thus making it clear that federal intervention in this area of economy
was not a transient matter, limited only to short-term factors such as the
OPEC embargo.
In November 1978 Congress passed a substantially modified version of
President Carter•s energy plan.

The new law gave the President authority to

phase out price controls on oil over an extended period of time.
approach, a growing proportion of oil from
prices.

Thus, by December 1979 an

day could sell 12 barrels at
barrels at the higher price.

11

11

11

Under this

old 11 wells could be solo at

11

new 11

old 11 well producing 100 barrels of oil a

new 11 prices; by December 1980 it could sell 54
In January 1981, President Reagan used the

authority of the 1978 law to eliminate price and allocation controls over
gasoline and petroleum products.
The 1978 law was more ambivalent on natural gas, extending price controls
to cover previously exempt intrastate gas.

In general, the 1978 act contained

price escalation provisions which permitted increases only at the general rate
of inflation.

Three exceptions were provided:

(a) new gas, (b) high-cost gas

produced from depths of 15,000 feet or greater, and (c) small wells (so-called
stripper well production).

These latter categories were allowed additional

price increases of 3 1/2 to 4 percent a year.

8

The 1978 law provided partial decontrol of natural gas in the following
manner:

In November 1979 the price of new, high-cost gas was decontrolled.

Moreover, on January 1, 1985, three more categories are to be decontrolled,
including gas produced from wells drilled after February 19, 1977, and at
least two-and-a-half miles from the nearest existing well or at least 1,000
feet below the deepest well within two-and-a-half miles.

On July 1, 1987,

decontrol is provided for new wells from depths of 5,000 feet or less.

The

prices for all other categories of natural gas will continue to be controlled
permanently.

Table 2 shows the complexity of federal regulation of natural

gas pricing.
The Energy Tax Act of 1978, on the other hand, did create a variety of
specialized tax incentives -- but limited them to non-petroleum energy
sources.

For example, after September 30, 1978, production from geothermal

deposits became eligible for percentage depletion at the same rate as that for
oil and gas, but with no limit on output and no restriction with respect to
the size of qualifying producers.

In lieu of percentage depletion, royalties

from coal deposits are treated as capital gains rather than ordinary income.
The 1978 Act also provides a 15 percent income tax credit to individuals
\

for home insulation and other energy conserving components, up to a maximum
credit of $300.

A credit of 30 percent on the first $2,000 of expenditures

and 20 percent on the next $8,000 is allowed for solar and other renewable
energy source property.

For business, the Act sets an additional 10 percent

credit on such specified energy property as recycling equipment, shale oil
equipment, equipment for producing natural gas from geopressurized brine, and
so forth.5
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TABLE 2
Complications in Decontrolling the Price of Natural Gas

Type of Production

Price
as of Jan. 1979
(per million BTUs)

Date of Deregulation

Stripper well
New outer continental shelf leases
(after 4/20/77)
Ne~ onshore wells
New onshore reserviors
Gas from reservoirs discovered after
7/26/76 on pre-4/20/77 shelf leases
Production from below 15,000 feet
from wells drilled after 2/19/77

$2.24
2.10

Not deregulated
1/1/85.

2.10
2.10
2.10

1/1/85
1/1/85
Not deregulated

2.10

Onshore - below 5,000 feet
Onshore - above 5,000 feet
Interstate commerce gas - before
enactment - wells started
1/1/75-2/18/77
Prodhoe Bay - Alaska gas or gas not
otherwise covered
Interstate commerce gas - before
enactment - wells started
1/1/73-12/31/74
Small Producer
Large Producer
Sales under "rollover" contracts intrastate
Replacement contract or
recompletion - small producer
Interstate rollover contracts small producer
Interstate rollover contracts 1arge producer
Replacement contract or recompletion
Certain Permian Basin gas - small
producer
Certain Rocky Mountain gas small producer
Certain Permian Basin gas 1arge producer
Certain Rocky Mountain gas large producer
Certain Appalachian Basin gas north sub area - contract after
10/7/69
Other contracts
Minimum rate gas - all producers
Sold unter existing intrastate
contract

1.98
1.98
1.64

Deregulated on effective
date of FERC incremental pricing rule
1/1/85
1/1/87
Not deregulated

1.64

Not deregulated

Source:

1.39
1.06
1.00 or more
.78

Not deregulated

.72

Not deregulated

.61

Not deregulated

.60
.47

Not deregulated
Not deregulated

.47

Not deregulated

.41

Not deregulated

.40

Not deregulated

.37

Not deregulated

.35
.20
Contract Price

Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978

Not deregulated
Not deregu 1at ed
1/1/85 if > $1.00

Not deregulated
Not deregulated
1/1/85 if > $1.00; not
deregulated if lower
than $1.00
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In 1980, the Congress enacted a 11 Windfall profits 11 tax to siphon off to
the Treasury a large part of the increased revenue resulting from both the
rising world oil prices and the phased decontrol of domestic oil prices.
Price and allocation controls were eliminated in January 1981, and the
windfall profits tax is scheduled to expire in 1990 (unless the revenue
objectives are achieved sooner).

The tax is a specified percentage of the

difference between the sales price in the field and the base price for each
category of oil, adjusted for inflation after June 1979, using the GNP
deflator with a six-month data lag.

For example, oil from Prudhoe Bay is

taxed at a 70 percent rate on revenue above a $12.80 a barrel (adjusted for
inflation), while stripper oil is taxed at a 60 percent rate on revenue above
$15.20 a barrel (adjusted for inflation) and new, tertiary, and heavy oil is
taxed at a 30 percent rate on revenue above $16.55 a barrel (adjusted for
inflation plus two percent).
deductible.

State severance taxes of up to 15 percent are

The tax is limited to 90 percent of net income from the

property.
The windfall profits tax is scheduled to be phased out over a 33-month
period at a rate of three percent a month, beginning in January 1988 or the
month after cumulative tax revenues have reached $227 billion, whichever is
later.

If the $227 billion figure is not attained, the phaseout would start

no later than January 1991.
Although we cannot estimate precisely the negative effects on domestic
oil production of the new excise tax levied under the guise of 11 Windfall
profits taxation, .. the direction of the impact is clear:

the less revenue to

-a producer from a barrel of oil, the lower the resultant supply will be.
Surely, a lower domestic supply of oil will be economically feasible at a net
5Ibid, p. 219.
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revenue of $20 per barrel (after payment of the tax) than would have been
forthcoming at, say, $30 per barrel, without the tax.

We do not know the

precise 11 elasticity 11 or responsiveness of supply to price, but clearly the
relationship is positive.

The higher the price, the greater the supply

forthcoming, and vice versa.
Clearly, this special tax -- levied in addition to the regular taxes paid
by petroleum and other companies -- also reduces the amount of funds that the
industry has available for investment in domestic equipment, development,
production, and refining.

For example, Exxon estimates its

tax in 1980 at $800 million.

11

Windfall profits 11

This sum is the equivalent of drilling 800

wells at an average cost of $1 million each or investing over 3,000
crew-months of seismic exploration. 6 Simultaneously, of course, the windfall
profits tax increases the ability of the government to take a more active role
in financing energy activities.
This tax is, moreover, an extremely complex piece of legislation when
viewed in terms of the costly administrative burdens that it imposes on the
private sector.

For example, hundreds of thousands of informational documents

have to be exchanged between royalty owners, producers, operators, and
purchasers.?

Table 3, containing an approximation of the computation of the

tax on selected categories of oil, may provide the reader with some indication
of the intricacies involved in complying with the windfall profits tax.
The law instituting the windfall profits tax also provides for a $3 per
barrel tax credit for producers of designated alternative energy sources:
6McCarter Middlebrook, Testimony for the American Petroleum Institute
et al. to the Internal Revenue Service Re: Costs, Etc., of Collecting
Windfall Profits Tax, July 25, 1980, p. 2.
?Issues in Review, Exxon Company, USA, June 1Y80, p. 2.

TABLE 3
Computation of Windfall Profit Tax on
Selected Crude Oil Categories for March 198o(1)

27° ANS
(Sadlerochit)

Tier 1
40° South
louisiana
Upper Market
Tier
Tier

40° West Texas
Sour
Upper
Market
Tier
.lli!._ So. La.

Posted price (3/12/80
posting ANS estimated
average net back)~

15.45

14.18

38.00

13.93

36.00

Base price -- tier 1-5/79
U.T. ceiling minus $.21

12.70

13.03

13.03

12.78

12.78

Tier 2 - 15.20 x highest
35.00
1/14/80 posting for 12/79

Tier 2

Tier 3

W. Tex. S.

So. LA.

38.00

36.00

38.00

36.00

16.07

15.20

17.50

16.55

Tier 3 - 16.55 x highest
35.00
1/14/80 posting for 12/79
Inflation adjustment
( )
Tiers 1 &2 - .01(5~72 2
Tier 3 - .0246348 3
Adjusted base price
TAPS adjustment

W. Tex. S.

.25

.25

.25

.25

.25

• 31

.30

.43

.41

12.95

13.28

13.28

13.03

13.03

16.38

15.50

17.93

16.96

.08
t->

Severance tax adj~s~ment on
price increment 4

N

.29

.11

3.09

.04

1.06

2.70

.94

2.51

.88

"Windfall profit"

2.13

.79

21.63

.86

2i.91

18.92

19.56

17.56

18.16

Windfall profit tax

1.49

.55

15.14

.60

15.34

11.35

11.74

5.27

5.45

12.18

11.86

18.11

12.69

19.00

21.90

22.60

27.98

28.89

Wellhead realization net of
WPT and severance tax
(1)
(2)
(.3)
(4)

Ignoring net income limitation
*GBO 79-111, 166.99 minus GNP 79-11, 163.79) : 163.79
(GNP 79-111, 166.99 times 1.005 minus GNP 79-11, 163.79) : 163.79
Using 11.5% effective rate for ANS, 12.5 for So. La., 4.6% for W. Tex. Sour.
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(1)

oil from shale and tar sands,

(2)

natural gas from tight sands, geopressured brine, coal seams
or Devonian shale,

(3)

synthetic fuels (other than alcohol) from coal, and

(4)

certain energy from biomass, wood, and agricultural products.

This credit will be phased out as the average wellhead price for uncontrolled
domestic oil rises from $23.50 a barrel to $29.50 a barrel (measured in 1979
dollars).

Other tax credit provisions include extension of gasohol •s

exemption from the four cents a gallon federal excise tax from 1984 to 1992,
and additional tax crerlits for business investment in solar, wind, and
geothermal equipment, in cogeneration equipment, and for residential solar,
wind and geothermal investments.
The residential tax credit under the act has been increased to 40 percent
on qualifying expenditures up to $10,000 a year for a maximum credit of
$4,000.
percent.

The business tax credit has been increased from 10 percent to 15
The termination date has been postponed from December 31, 1982, to

December 31, 1985, and cogeneration equipment has been added to the list of
property eligible for the credit.
To recapitulate, the full list of alternative energy property qualifying
for the energy tax credit follows:
A.

Alternative energy property which includes:
(1) boilers or other burners, the primary fuel of which is
fuel other than oil, gas, or products from oil and gas
(i.e., alternative substances);
(2) equipment used to convert alternate substances into
synthetic liquid, gaseous or solid fuel (other than coke
or coke gas);

14
(3) equipment used to convert or modify existing oil and gas
burners to use alternate substances as fuel (or a fuel
mixture with content of at least 25 percent alternate
substances);
(4) equipment which uses coal (including lignite) as a
feedstock for the manufacture of chemicals or other
products (other than coke or coke gas);
(5) pollution control equipment required by federal, state,
or local regulations to be installed in connection with
such alternate energy property;
(6) equipment used generally in the storage, transfer or
preparation of alternate substance for use in alternate
energy property;
(7) equipment used to produce, distribute or use energy
derived from a geothermal deposit (up to but not
including the electrical transmission stage for
electricity produced by geothermal power).
B.

Solar or wind energy property.

C.

Specially defined energy property, including recuperators,
heat wheels, regenerators, heat exchangers, waste heat
boilers, heat pipes, automatic energy control systems,
preheaters, combustible gas recovery systems, or any other
kinds of property which are specified in Treasury
regulations, the primary purpose of which is to reduce the
amount of energy consumption in existing industrial or
commerical facilities.
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D.

Solid waste recycling equipment.

E.

Property used to mine and extract oi 1 from sha 1e (through ·
retorting).

F.

Equipment for producing natural gas from geopressured brine.

It is intriguing to note that the Congressional deliberations on the
windfall profits tax also served, in effect, to set aside consideration of
proposed changes in the foreign tax credit which would have a serious effect
on the petroleum industry's overseas activities.

In April 1979, President

Carter announced that he would propose legislation to limit the foreign tax
credit allowed for income taxes paid on foreign oil and gas extraction income.
In June 1979, the Treasury sent to Congress its legislative proposal to limit
such credits to the lesser of:

(1) the tax credit computed with respect to overall foreign
oil and gas extraction income (net of losses), or
(2) the tax credit computed with respect to such income on a
country-by-country basis.
In effect, the administration's plan would have reduced the total credits
from all foreign oil and gas extraction operations by offsetting net income in
some countries with net losses in others.

This would have eliminated some

foreign tax credits for foreign income taxes actually paid by oil companies
and, thus, it would have subjected the firms to double taxation.

In early

1980, however, the Secretary of Treasury William Miller advised the Senate

Finance Committee that he would propose a revised set of foreign tax credit
changes.

The Treasury Department subsequently indicated it would not put

forth any new suggestions in this area until after the windfall profits tax
was signed into law.

The Reagan Administration has not pursued the matter.
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In the future, if any legislative attention is given to the foreign tax
credit, it should be noted that reducing or eliminating this provision would
handicap U.S. oil companies relative to their foreign competitors and, thus,
impede the search for new energy sources.
history and precedent behind it.

The foreign tax credit has much

The credit was created in 1918 to protect

all U.S. taxpayers earning foreign income from being taxed twice on it:

once

by the foreign government and again by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service.
Nearly every industrial nation has a similar procedure for avoiding double
taxation.

Some, like France and the Netherlands, exempt their oil companies'

foreign income altogether.
Some Relevant History of Energy Shifts
There clearly seems to be problems of consistency in relating the
long-term goal of increasing domestyc energy supplies and the impacts of
taxation and related regulatory policies.

On the basis of the ambitious

investment schedule quoted earlier, one might have expected a more supportive
or at least less inhibiting set of policies toward the petroleum companies
which constitute the central sector of the energy industry.

However, a survey

of past tax policy toward the energy industry does not generate much
enthusiasm for instituting yet another round of specialized tax treatment.
It is useful, however, to draw upon earlier and more successful
experiences in American history, when this nation faced significant shifts in
energy production and consumption.
satisfactorily in the past.

Those adjustments proceeded quite

Successive shifts occurred from one energy source

to another, as the underlying economics

relative prices -- changed.

For example, in 1800, illumination in America was provided mainly by
candles and oil lamps, with fuel for the lamps coming from whale oil.

Whales
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did not become extinct as the country grew.

As the price of whale oil rose

from 23 cents a gallon in 1832 to $1.45 in 1865, consumers switched to
substitutes.

In the 1850s, coal oil or kerosene derived from coal

distillation dominated the residential market for illumination.

In turn, its

success was followed by an equally meteoric decline in favor of a new fuel
that had appeared in the market, petroleum.

By 1863, virtually all coal

refiners had switched over to crude-oil refining, and many new refineries
appeared.
Thus, the shifts from whale oil to kerosene to gasoline resulted not from
an act of Congress or a subsidy from the Treasury, but from successive
movements in the price of energy.

The implication for our times is clear:

the sooner that government frees existing energy sources, such as natural gas,
from artificial price restraints, the sooner will new domestic energy sources
become commerically competitive.

Conversely, the continuation of price

controls on natural gas delays the time when new domestic sources, including
solar energy or synthetic fuels, will come into widespread use.

The major

spur to developing domestic energy sources will not be government subsidy, but
price decontrol of existing energy sources. 8
These interactions are currently most visible in the area of natural gas.
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 was designed to raise the wellhead prices
of natural gas in order to achieve a balance between supply and demand in
1988.

As pointed out above, the legislation specified gradual price increases

for various categories of gas, based on a projected price of oil that today is
considerably lower than current oil prices.

This price disparity has prompted

new inefficiencies in the allocation and consumption of natural gas.
8weidenbaum, ~cit., pp. 114-120.

The
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smooth transition to a deregulated market envisioned by the framers of the Act
may not occur.
At the present time, high-priced natural gas is being imported from
Canada at a time when cheaper U.S. supplies are in surplus.

The problems in

the gas market have been caused by the interaction of inflexible federal price
control and rigid contracts between pipeline companies and producers.

The

contracts, in turn, were by-products of the long and convoluted history of
government regulation of energy.
The basic problem is that federal regulation is too rigid to allow gas
prices to reflect changing conditions.

Natural gas prices are now at levels

that have encouraged switching back to oil.

With an estimated 15 percent of

capacity idle, it is not clear that a sharp run up in prices would result if
natural gas were deregulated. 9 The successful decontrol of oil prices two
years ago provides the appropriate model.
The Future Role of Energy Tax Policy
When we examine the prospects for using tax policy to increase the
likelihood of achieving the nation•s investment targets, we find that there
are many competing demands for tax reform.
alternatives for Congress to choose from:

There is no shortage of
(1) moving to a flat or at least

flatter income tax structure, (2) shifting the basis of federal taxation from
income to sales or value added, (3) enhancing the equity of the tax system by
closing all those

11

loopholes," and (4) increasing revenues in order to reduce

the extremely large budget deficits that are in prospect for the next several
9congressional Budget Office, Natural Gas Pricing Policies, Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1983, p. 1; 11 Natural-Gas Deregulation: Time To
Act, .. Morgan Guaranty Survey, January 1983, pp. 12-13.
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years.

Thus, any consideration of changes in energy taxation specifically

must be placed in the larger context of changes in tax policy generally.
In a private enterprise economy, it is not appropriate that government,
via tax policies or other mechanisms, guarantee that the energy industry will
secure a larger total flow of funds in the 1980s.

But the policies are needed

to enable the energy industry to compete for those funds on an equal basis
with other industries -- with no special subsidies and no special handicaps.
The key alternative, in contrast, is an approach to industrial policy
characterized by a series of quick fixes as the various sectors of society
compete for specific government assistance.

An important added benefit would

accrue from the market-oriented approach proposed here -- a higher level of
efficiency in the American economy, with a shift from dependence on government
direction to reliance on competition in the market place.
The Future Role of Regulatory Policy
The expansion of environmental and other regulation has created major
obstacles facing virtually every proposed energy project -- including those
that are finally approved.

Without downplaying the importance of tax

considerations, perhaps the most serious energy problem in the United States
today is the long delays that occur during the planning and construction
phases of new energy projects.

The delays do not arise primarily out of

technology or problems in financing; they are, instead, the result of
government.
From the investor•s viewpoint, those problems increase uncertainty -which can be devastating for major capital projects such as those involved in
developing new forms of energy.

An act of Congress finally was required to
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a~d

ecological barriers so that the Alaskan pipeline could

As an example of the governmental obstacles, the following are 14

major regulatory constraints to be faced in developing a new synthetic fuel
project, any one of which could bring a project to a halt.
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Preparing an environmental impact statement, as required by the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
Meeting new source performance standards for air quality, under
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.
Meeting the hazardous pollutant emission standards, under the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.
Meeting the state air-quality implementation plans required by
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.
Obtaining necessary point source discharge permits, under the
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.
Meeting state water quality standards and water quality management plans, as promulgated under the Clean Water Act of 1977
Complying with limitations applicable to "underground injections,"
under the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974.
Complying with the regulaton of interstate pipeline transmissions,
under the Interstate Commerce Act.
Complying with the prohibition against a carrier transporting its
own products, under the Interstate Commerce Act.
Complying with the regulation of interstate transmission of
synthetic gas once it is mixed with natural gas, under the
Natural Gas Act of 1978.
Obtaining necessary plant and mine leases from the U.S. Bureau
of Land Management.
Obtaining necessary water allocations from the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation.
Complying with the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended. 1 0

10President's Energy Resources Council, Synfuels Interagency Task Force,
Recommendations for a Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program, vol. 1,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), and more recent
data.
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The uncertainty for private industry resulting from the way in which
various environmental programs are carried out can be overwhelming in the case
of a new energy facility.
power-generating plans

In many cases, various energy projects and
nuclear and non-nuclear alike -- have never become

operational because of the delays.

Yet, public concern about pollution of air

and water and destruction of natural resources continues to be very real.

The

need, thus, is for a careful review of the vast and cumbersome regulatory
labyrinth and the elimination of regulations that do not pass the economic
test of generating more benefits than costs.11
Conclusions and Recommendations
A realistic and effective government policy for energy development
requires changes in the federal tax and regulatory systems.
fall into two categories:

These changes

(1) eliminating the special benefits that have been

granted to the various segments of the energy industry, and (2) simultaneously
removing the many obstacles that have been placed in the industry's path.
basic approach suggested here is a new twist to an old saying:
stand there, undo something.

The

"Don't just

The following is a brief outline of the needed

changes:
(1) Eliminate the windfall profits tax.

That tax does nothing to help

curtail energy consumption, but it simultaneously reduces the
financial ability of the private sector to increase domestic energy
production.
(2) Eliminate the regulatory functions of the Department of Energy.
The sooner that domestic energy prices equal world market
11Murray L. Weidenbaum, The Future of Business Regulation, New York,
Amacom, 1980.
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prices, the sooner will new domestic energy sources -conventional and unconventional, including synthetic fuel,
solar energy, etc. -- become competitive.

Moreover, realistic

prices will become the most effective stimulus to energy
conservation.

Deregulation of natural gas prices is long

overdue.
(3) Eliminate the host of tax breaks for specialized energy projects.
Tax subsidies would no longer be needed in an environment where
realistic energy prices prevail.

The experience of the home

insulation industry is instructive.

The producers in that

industry found that their order books became full just as soon as
the public realized that insulation was a good way of reducing
high and rising energy costs.

The federal subsidies came later.

(4) Cut back the regulatory obstacles which impede the construction
and operation of new energy projects.

What is truly needed is

not a special board to cut red tape for a few arbitrarily selected
energy projects, but comprehensive reform of the entire
regulatory process.

Without these reforms, many of the tax

incentives for new investment will turn out to be ineffective.
The inability to obtain the many government permits and approvals
needed for a new project cannot be overcome by increasing the
normal after-tax rate of return.

At present, the thicket of

government rules makes every proposed energy project an
attractive target for any self-appointed advocate of the status
quo and for opponents of economic growth.
(5) Cut back the expenditure subsidies for the highly specific energy
activities that the Congress arbitrarily has chosen to support.
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These special aids would no longer be necessary if the first four
proposals are adopted.

The elimination of the windfall profits

tax revenues would make it more urgent to reduce these lowpriority outlays in order to minimize budget deficits.
Boiled down to its essence, the most effective national policy to promote
domestic energy development is to achieve a well-functioning market economy
that does not require special policies for any specific industry -- energy or
any other.

The optimum energy tax policy is to tax the activities of the

energy industry exactly the same way as any other business is taxed -- without
prejudice or favoritism.

